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Showing reviews 26-30 of 30
 Feels like an episode of 24 May 26, 2009
A. Patel (Dallas, TX United States)
1 out of 3 found this review helpful
Very well written book that makes you feel like you were sitting in all the meetings. These are the insider stories that anybody with an interest in the financial and capital markets will certainly enjoy. You don't have to possess in-depth knowledge about the credit crisis to follow the book, but I think readers with at least some knowledge will find it more captivating.
A dramatic TKO on Wall Street May 21, 2009
Robert Morris (Dallas, Texas)
12 out of 15 found this review helpful
As I began to read this account of "the last 72 hours of Bear Stearns, the toughest firm on Wall Street," so powerful are Kate Kelly's narrative and descriptive skills that it soon seemed as if I were seeing a film rather than reading a book. Colorful characters, fast-moving plot, vivid images, lively dialog, riveting conflicts and confrontations, increasing tension, and then....
The book's narrative begins at 5:30 P.M. on Thursday, March 13, 2008, and continues until 8:30 PM on Sunday, March 16, 2008, followed by an Epilogue in which Kelly reviews subsequent developments at other firms (e.g. Lehman, AIG, Merrill) and provides a follow-up on Bear Stearns' key leaders. From Thursday through Sunday, at a pace that astonished everyone involved, the once-proud firm of "street fighters...lean, scrappy, and hungry for profits," a firm that had "an underdog's spirit, and relished the chance to knock more well-heeled firms down a peg or two," saw its stock take a "breathtaking drop." It had sold for $172 in January of 2007, was selling for $57 on March 13, 2008, and continued to plunge so far and so fast ($30.00 on March 14) that when Bear received J.P. Morgan Chase's final offer, the stock was valued at $2.00.
How to explain Bear's decline and fall? Kelly offers several reasons. Here are four:
1. Dysfunctional leadership (e.g. its CFO, Sam Molinaro, was "hopelessly disorganized" amidst toxic infighting between and among the firm's leaders)
2. Decision-making that Jim Collins describes (in How the Mighty Fall) as "grasping for salvation" in Stage 4 of a five-stage process of organizational decline
3. Indifference to promising new diagnostics such as a risk-assessment matrix to pinpoint the firm's exposure to the markets that a Bear employee had taken years to develop
4. Senior managers' obsession with wealth accumulation, with a concern for the firm's welfare only to the extent that it enabled them to achieve that objective
Over time, it became obvious to Bear's leaders (including board members) that the firm would either have to accept the best offer (and whether or not there would be any remained in doubt throughout most of the frantic weekend) or file for bankruptcy. Meanwhile, negotiations continued with other firms (notably J.P. Morgan Chase, Goldman Sachs, and J.C. Flowers), with the Federal Reserve (Tim Geithner, Ben Bernanke, and Kevin Walsh), and the U.S. Treasury (Hank Paulson and Bob Steel). Advisors to Bear Stearns included Gary Parr (Lazard), Rodge Cohen (Sullivan & Cromwell LLP), and Dennis Block (Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft LLP). Finally, the deal was made with J.P. Morgan Chase.
In her Epilogue, Kelly notes that "Bear failed because the credit crisis of 2008 killed every firm with a large mortgage business, too little diversification to offset the losses from bad loans, and the inability to be proactive. These factors ruined Lehman Brothers, and, directly or indirectly, almost sank Fannie, Freddie, AIG, and Merrill Lynch - until the government, private industry, or both stanched the bleeding." She goes on to suggest that, among the investment banks that once dominated the U.S. economy, Bear, the fifth largest, "was also uniquely vulnerable. The simple spirit that made Ace Greenberg the company's most celebrated figure - that of cutting losses early, saving money on paper clips and envelopes, and guarding religiously against outsized risk - had long since been replaced by a more cavalier outlook. Its chief proponent was Jimmy Cayne." It seems probable that the firm's subsequent decline can be traced back to Cayne's appointment as CEO but there were others who must share the blame, notably the firm's subsequent CEO, Alan Schwartz, who "was in denial about his company's travails and when capital-generating opportunities appeared in January and February, he "essentially dismissed them."
As Schwartz departed Bear's headquarters on Sunday evening, Parr caught up with him in the hallway and urged him to feel very good about what he had accomplished. "You've done a remarkable job in working this through." Schwartz shook his head, struggling to collect himself. "I feel terrible," he finally said.
The End
 Mixed Thoughts! May 13, 2009
Loyd E. Eskildson (Phoenix, AZ.)
0 out of 9 found this review helpful
Bear Stearns was the first major Wall Street player to fall in the current economic crisis. "Street Fighters" details the last three days of the firm, hour by hour, guided by interviews with about 100 of the participants.
In just a few days Bear Stearns went from having over $15 billion in cash, its largest cash position ever, to being sold for only $250 million, despite Federal Reserve guarantees limiting J.P. Morgan's potential exposure. (The sale price was later raised to $1.2 billion). Even that didn't shake the market too much - the DJIA fell only to the area of 13,000. Part of the reason for the limited impact may have been its reputation as a firm of gunslingers with little aptitude for hedging or risk management - and that's putting it nicely given the mismanagement that led to its demise.
Most of Bear's employees, however, didn't fare so well - only 6,500 of the 14,000 moved over to J.P. Morgan.
The "good news" is that shortly after Bear failed, the Federal Reserve began allowing investment banks to also borrow from it. The "bad news" is that Lehman Bros., IndyMac bank, and Countrywide Mortgage also failed, and the Federal Reserve had to take large positions in Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, AIG, Citibank, etc. to get through the financial storm.
Why the "mixed feelings" comment? The story has already been reasonably well told by others, and its time to move onto broader-based analyses.
What a Great Story! May 12, 2009
F. Hollister (Big Island of Alameda)
4 out of 33 found this review helpful
Kate Kelly is being interviewed on "Fresh Air" as I write this review. It is a wonderful (and quite rare) experience to hear a writer so articulate and so knowledgable about today's complex financial markets.
I have spent over two decades in verious aspects of real estate finance. So much of what I've read and heard is simply misleading, if not flat out wrong.
It is clear Ms. Kelly really knows this subject, and she has the ability to communicate clearly.
I have not yet read her book. I just heard about it for the first time this morning. However, after hearing this interview I can not wait to read it. I'm thinking it will make an excellent companion volume to Warren Buffet's "Snowball."
Who To Blame For The Bear Stern Collapse? Meet the Suspects.... May 12, 2009
Sacramento Book Review (Sacramento, CA)
26 out of 32 found this review helpful
Kate Kelly originally wrote this story for the Wall Street Journal last May, detailing the events that lead up to the complete collapse of Bear Stearns during last year's mortgage meltdown. Here in //Street Fighters//, she expands the story, covering the 72 hours from Thursday, March 13, to Sunday, March 16, 2008. There are plenty of flashbacks of the previous year, explaining how Bear became over-leveraged in toxic mortgage assets and how they ended up "suddenly" with too little operating cash for business the next day and ended up being sold to JP Morgan for a rock-bottom $2.00 a share.
Kelly interviewed players in and out of Bear, coordinating stories to create a compelling narrative of hubris, greed, and a culture of doing whatever it took to make the deal; including the last-minute fire sale.
There are plenty of personality vignettes, from Alan Schwartz, Bear's CEO and Jimmy Cayne Bear's Chairman to Tim Geithner, the president of Federal Reserve Bank of New York and Warren Buffett. Her accusation of Cayne's preference for bridge or smoking pot (or both) rather than going to work at Bear may be either be the titillation to sell the book or State's Exhibit One for why the environment at Bear Sterns lead to its ignominious end.
It is a highly readable account, both of the failure of Bear Stern and the trading in Mortgage Backed Securities that lead to the entire market meltdown. In some ways, it is a disturbing story, with then-Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson insisting on the $2.00 a share buyout price to punish Bear for their recklessness and how many of the Bear traders and executives not only landed on their feet, but are still active in the trading community.
Bear may be gone, but their spirit still lives on.
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