|  | Author: Gillian Tett Publisher: Tantor Media
List Price: $34.99 Buy New: $20.26 as of 11/23/2009 18:09 CST details You Save: $14.73 (42%)
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Seller: a1books Rating: 46 reviews Sales Rank: 113516
Format: Audiobook, CD, Unabridged Languages: English (Original Language), English (Unknown), English (Published) Media: Audio CD Edition: Unabridged CD Number Of Items: 8 Shipping Weight (lbs): 0.4 Dimensions (in): 6.5 x 5.5 x 1.1
ISBN: 1400112834 Dewey Decimal Number: 332.660973 EAN: 9781400112838 ASIN: 1400112834
Publication Date: July 1, 2009 Availability: Usually ships in 1-2 business days Condition: Brand new item. Over 6 million customers served. Order now. Selling online since 1995. Order with confidence. Code: B20090808210327T
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Showing reviews 21-25 of 46
Flawed critique of capitalism's crimes July 20, 2009 William Podmore (London United Kingdom) 2 out of 8 found this review helpful
Gillian Tett, a Financial Times journalist, shows how a group of JPMorgan Chase bankers wrecked the financial system and plunged the world into depression. Typically, they deny all responsibility, echoed by Tett, who sees the disaster as the result, not of the application of their innovation, but of its perversion.
Their big con was packaging default risk so they could sell it - they said - without risk: the market would magic the risk away! Then they put these dodgy deals into shell companies, mostly based in the Caymans, to shift the deals off the books. (Try telling the taxman that your income is `off the books'!)
They were breaking (not, as Tett claims, `evading' or `circumventing') the rules that limit the amount of loans they could hold on their books. They sold the risks and took the profits.
All capitalism's institutions embraced their crimes. The IMF, for example, said, "The dispersion of credit risk by banks to a broader and more diverse set of investors, rather than warehousing such risk on their balance sheets, has helped to make the banking and overall financial system more resilient." This dispersion would help to `mitigate and absorb shocks to the financial system' ensuring `fewer bank failures and more consistent credit provision'. But dispersion did not spread and lessen risk, but increased it, focused it and then hid it.
Capitalism's leaders played down the results of these crimes. Henry Paulson, the US Treasury Secretary, told Congress in spring 2007 that the subprime problem `appears to be contained'. Ben Bernanke, the Federal Reserve governor, said, "we see no serious broader spillover to banks or thrift institutions from the problems in the subprime market."
On 18 July 2007, another senior US official said, "It seems very far-fetched to make any parallels with Japan's crisis. The key thing to remember is that these losses are not just held by American banks, as the bad loans were in Japan, but they are dispersed." Bill Dudley, of the New York Federal Reserve, said, "This is a correction, but it is not dramatic in light of history ... it could be over in a matter of weeks."
The bankers, like our rulers, are all mad free-marketeers: for them, society does not exist, nor does Britain, only money.
Examining the broader financial crisis through J. P. Morgan July 17, 2009 Todd B. Frary (Atlanta, GA USA) 1 out of 2 found this review helpful
While many sectors of the economy are collapsing the output of books on the economic crisis is booming. Many are shameless attempts by an author to cash in on their expertise or background and lack the capacity to cover complicated financial and macroeconomic issues well. Quite simply put, the economic crisis has too many causes to be easily addressed in a comprehensive manner no matter how talented the author on the subject. Typically speaking the best books on finance or microeconomics focus more narrowly on a single company or deal, such as "Barbarians at the Gate" about the takeover of RJR Nabisco or "The Smartest Guys in the Room" about the Enron fiasco. "Fools Gold" wisely follows in a similar vein, focusing more narrowly on risk-taking at J. P. Morgan in the run-up to the present economic collapse. Best of all Gillian Tett is a journalist for the Financial Times and has the well-developed journalistic abilities to tell a story well and the insider knowledge and connections to be thorough. Tett is something of an enfant terrible in the financial community as she had been warning of the potential for a crisis before it broke. Rather than "Fools Gold" being "I-told-you so" self-aggrandizement, it is instead perhaps one of the best told narratives on the often murky world of credit derivatives that were at the core of the crisis. In the midst of the pack of innovative financial institutions was J. P. Morgan, and while it has weathered the crisis better than others it certainly doesn't rob the book of drama. Certainly a title on Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers or Merrill Lynch would be far more dramatic with their ultimate dénouement, but "Fools Gold" is plenty readable and a cautionary tale for future investment bankers and financiers. While "Fools Gold" is microeconomic in scope it certainly sheds light on the larger factors at work in the crisis and is certainly an easier way to examine it. While there are countless other books out there on the subject, few are as well written as "Fools Gold."
Evolution of the events leading to the 2008 financial crisis July 8, 2009 Houman Tamaddon (Seattle, WA) 1 out of 2 found this review helpful
Tett is clear and entertaining which are excellent attributes for a book about the 2008 financial crisis. She attempts to explain how financial institutions through complex derivatives got themselves and more importantly the world into trouble. She tracks the evolution of some of the derivatives from their early days. In parts, her book is merely a recap of some of the events in the news during 2008. If you keep up with financial news (ie: read the Wall Street Journal), many parts of the book will be a review. Where Tett adds value is explaining how government regulation and perverse financial incentives evolved to get us into the crisis.
Derivatives can be very complex financial instruments that even the creators may not understand. Their value may be a function of so many underlying assets (ie: mortgages spread out all over the country) that their risks often were not been appreciated by the buyers. Despite the difficulty in understanding these instruments, Tett does a fine job explaining them. She also makes her book readable by following some of the players, many connected to J.P. Morgan.
Best Book on Derivatives so far July 4, 2009 William A. Thayer (San Diego, California United States) 3 out of 4 found this review helpful
On a 2008 tour to Greece, I asked a fellow tour member (a senior executive from the SEC) what derivatives were? He couldn't answer the question (which says a lot about the SEC). Well, he should read this book. It's easy to understand, and the layman can come out with an understanding of credit derivatives and shadow banking. The author's description of the Bear Stearns and Lehman bankruptcies is also the best I have read. In particular, she points out that Lehman relied heavily on Repos (loans for 0 to 180 days) so they were very vulnerable to a shutoff of lending (vs. having 2 to 5 year financing which probably would have saved them). She is a little weak and incomplete when it comes to numbers (what the heck, she has a PhD in "Social Anthropology"). Also, her coverage of Credit Default Swaps (no mention of Maiden Lane bailouts) is not thorough. Nevertheless, she has brought light to the purposely opaque world of mortgage backed derivatives (including the interesting story of how it all began). If you are interested in the causes the financial meltdown, this book is a 5 star help.
History of Derivatives July 4, 2009 Marc L. Ward (Wichita, Kansas USA) 0 out of 1 found this review helpful
I enjoyed this book in that it showed just as the title presented itself, A small tribe at JP Morgan and how it started the process. The book also showed how people used the credit derivatives for profit, but not ahearing to the old banking traditions. This was not how the original group intended the use of credit derivatives. I enjoyed the book and have now ordered more books on JP Morgan and Jamie Dimon.
Showing reviews 21-25 of 46
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