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A Demon of Our Own Design: Markets, Hedge Funds, and the Perils of Financial Innovation

A Demon of Our Own Design: Markets, Hedge Funds, and the Perils of Financial InnovationAuthor: Richard Bookstaber
Publisher: Wiley

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Rating: 4.5 out of 5 stars 64 reviews
Sales Rank: 24249

Media: Paperback
Pages: 304
Number Of Items: 1
Shipping Weight (lbs): 0.8
Dimensions (in): 8.9 x 5.9 x 0.9

ISBN: 0470393750
Dewey Decimal Number: 332
EAN: 9780470393758
ASIN: 0470393750

Publication Date: December 10, 2008
Availability: Usually ships in 1-2 business days

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  • ISBN13: 9780470393758
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Editorial Reviews:

Product Description
Inside markets, innovation, and risk

Why do markets keep crashing and why are financial crises greater than ever before? As the risk manager to some of the leading firms on Wall Street–from Morgan Stanley to Salomon and Citigroup–and a member of some of the world’s largest hedge funds, from Moore Capital to Ziff Brothers and FrontPoint Partners, Rick Bookstaber has seen the ghost inside the machine and vividly shows us a world that is even riskier than we think. The very things done to make markets safer, have, in fact, created a world that is far more dangerous. From the 1987 crash to Citigroup closing the Salomon Arb unit, from staggering losses at UBS to the demise of Long-Term Capital Management, Bookstaber gives readers a front row seat to the management decisions made by some of the most powerful financial figures in the world that led to catastrophe, and describes the impact of his own activities on markets and market crashes. Much of the innovation of the last 30 years has wreaked havoc on the markets and cost trillions of dollars. A Demon of Our Own Design tells the story of man’s attempt to manage market risk and what it has wrought. In the process of showing what we have done, Bookstaber shines a light on what the future holds for a world where capital and power have moved from Wall Street institutions to elite and highly leveraged hedge funds.


Customer Reviews:
Showing reviews 1-5 of 64
1 2 3 4 5 6 ...13Next »



3 out of 5 stars Had high hopes that fizzled half way through.   October 28, 2009
dust247 (Danville, CA USA)
As a full-time trader of 12+ years I've read most good trading books out there. In fact most of them I end up reading multiple times. This won't be one of those books. The first half is fun and informative story telling. The second half...well I can't even comment on it because I found myself just scanning the pages looking for anything interesting or new to no avail.

If you want a good read on trading look to Market Wizards, When Genius Failed (LTCM), and Reminiscences of a Stock Operator.



5 out of 5 stars A fresh look on complexity and risk management in the financial markets   July 18, 2009
Vasiliy Zhulin (bay area, CA USA)
1 out of 2 found this review helpful

In this book, Richard Bookstaber argues that complexity in the financial markets is an unfortunate evil, a consequence of ever more customized investment and hedging solutions. Unlike in other areas, innovation in finance does not make things safer, but instead more complex and hence more dangerous. Complexity by itself is not always bad, but combined with what Bookstaber calls "tight coupling," which means that all steps of a process are interlinked and dependent on each other with no slack, it makes for "normal accidents." Normal accidents are events that we believe to be incredibly rare - yet they occur much more frequently than expected.

How do we battle this problem? Bookstaber argues that more regulation and more transparency are both poor solutions. Regulation only increases complexity, further escalating the problem, and transparency leads to other various problems that stem from limitations of knowledge. Unfortunately, Bookstaber does not provide a clear solution. He believes we need to slow innovation in finance to reduce complexity and reduce leverage in order to give more slack to the system and hence help alleviate tight coupling. However, I don't see these as practical courses of action. Reducing complexity means being less responsive to clients' needs - something firms will never do in this industry. Reducing leverage means smaller returns, again something that the investment community overall is unlikely to agree on. Perhaps some regulation on leverage may be helpful, but hedge funds fall outside of common regulatory rules - and they have become a force to be reckoned with.

The book follows mostly a chronological format, from Bookstaber's early days at Morgan Stanley and Salomon Brothers to Ziff Brothers and Moore Capital. At Morgan Stanley, Bookstaber was involved with portfolio insurance, which was one of the major causes of the October 19, 1987 market crash, creating a downward spiral of selling due to dynamic hedging. At Salomon Brothers, Bookstaber encountered a culture totally different from that described by Michael Lewis in Liar's Poker - things have changed to a much more strict and controlled environment, one much less willing to take risks. Bookstaber describes several failures in risk management at various firms (Leeson at Barings, Jett at Kidder Peabody), and moves on to discussing merger arbitrage at Salomon, touching a bit on Jack Grubman and finally the purchase of Salomon by Sandy Weill and Citigroup.

Bookstaber spends some time describing LTCM and how it got into trouble (see When Genius Failed), and moves on to speaking about hedge funds in general. He defines hedge funds as the universe of all possible investment strategies minus the tiny slice of traditional investments. He discusses the efficient market hypothesis and explains why it doesn't fit with reality - due to liquidity constraints and the tendency of humans to have various risk preferences. He loves the concept of a cockroach, which ignores most of it senses and listens to a very simple fight-or-flight instict. Bookstaber believes this has allowed the cockroach to survive for so many millions of years. I am a bit skeptical of the argument, as it dismisses many biological issues, but it is entertaining none the less. Bookstaber thinks that we can adapt the cockroach approach to the financial markets and listen to our most basic instincts more often.

Being the risk management guru, Bookstaber also discusses how he feels risk management should be changed. He thinks it needs to be less complex and less overburdened by company politics and organization (as it was horribly so at Citigroup). Additionally, he believes that risk managers need to spend less time on known risks and invest more time looking towards unseen risk. This is somewhat paradoxical, since the whole concept of unseen risk is that... it can't be seen/predicted, but I do get the point. At the end, however, Bookstaber says that risk management is what it is - and we just have to learn to live with it, which is somewhat disappointing after his earlier ideas.

In conclusion, I really enjoyed the book. It is well written, easy to read, and provides a ton of excellent examples and history. At times, I felt it was a bit too philosophical for its own good. For example, Bookstaber spends a long time discussing the limits of knowledge (Godel vs Russell, Heisenberg vs Laplace, Lorenz's butterfly effect vs all future-prediction attempts), and it feels very Taleb-like, although much less annoying. Overall, however, the book provides a fresh way to look at risk management and some of the major recent crises. Bookstaber spends a long time discussing hedge funds and what they mean to the markets, and I particularly liked his brief ranting session on the obsolescence of modern accounting methods (including mark-to-market accounting).

Pros:
+ easy to read and understand, very well written
+ contains an excellent preface that addresses the current market crisis with concrete solutions
+ fresh views on accounting being antiquated and on the market NOT needing more transparency and regulation
+ fantastic examples, stories, and case studies
+ good discussion on complexity and tight coupling
+ interesting insights on hedge funds and their future
+ a tremendous amount of history to learn from

Cons:
- sometimes a bit too philosophical for its own good
- a lot of repetition scattered between chapters
- some of the suggestions seem too general and impractical



4 out of 5 stars Are Demons Inevitable?   July 6, 2009
Jon Thomas
1 out of 3 found this review helpful

The author is a Wall Street insider with much experience in investment banking risk assessment and hedge fund investment strategy. His anecdotes from his Wall Street associations are very entertaining and provide a view to the outsider of the internal workings of some of these investment firms.

His principal argument is that we've created these extremely complex financial instruments (demons) and as a result can expect to receive a witch's brew of unexpected results. Many of which will be highly indigestible to the individual investor and our society at large. Computerized trading, high speed communications, financial extensions into emerging markets, 1rst and 2nd and nth degree derivatives, etc., etc. all contribute to greater noise and volatility and the greater likelihood of financial meltdowns.

One of his conclusions in the book is that if government tries to regulate these complex and stormy financial markets with complex regulation that it will only make matters worse. Positive feedback mechanisms from unintended consequences by government intervention will likely increase market volatility. Government regulation can generally depress financial markets and consequently have negative effects on the general economy. Or so the author argues. For me, it's hard to see how governmental regulation could make things much worse than they already are. The degree of short sightedness, fraud, and malfeasance in the financial institutions in the last decade or two can hardly be overstated--in my view.

However, he does (eventually) come out for reform. I do like his coarse, loose coupling approach along these lines for financial system reform. He argues that tight coupling of trading, excessive leveraging, excessive faith in mathematically based financial models, etc. have led us to our present financial disaster. Consequently, we need to slow and moderate our financial systems and instead of having systems with agents that have the reactive speeds of over-caffeinated beavers, create conditions and systems so that the agents have the coarse reactive speed and cognitive framing of cockroaches. I didn't make up the cockroach analogy, the author did. The cockroach trader ignores irrelevant indicators of the moment and responds, instead, with full and deliberate speed to real threats. Not a bad strategy since the cockroach, as he points out, has been around for 100's of millions of years. Interesting that he chose the cockroach as a model for stock traders to emulate. These days brokers and traders seem to be held in as high esteem by the general public as lawyers. Hopefully, I haven't insulted any lawyers.

While the book may be "easy as pie" for MIT Phd's to digest, ordinary mortals may have a few difficulties wading through it if they are not fairly familiar with financial markets and Wall Street. It's worth the effort, though, because the more that citizens learn about Wall Street, the more they will most likely wish to reform it. And reform, in my view, is most certainly what is needed....



4 out of 5 stars For risk managers, heads of financial institutions and govt watchdogs, though it still wont help at all   June 30, 2009
ServantofGod
1 out of 2 found this review helpful

I am obliged to commend that the author had given an exhaustive account of the major financial turmoils of the last two decades before the great awakening starting 2007. What differentiates this from Liar's Poker, Fiasco, Devil Take the Hindmost, Eyewitness to Wall Street, "Traders, Guns and Money" etc is its quant and risk manager perspective below the strong pessimissm advocating that the complexity and tight coupling of contemporary financial innovations make financial catatrophes inevitable. The author's absolutely right in his conclusion, though he had failed to see the destructive power of CDS/MBS and the related financial tsunami himself. No matter what, this is a good book with well organized and logical arguments. The writing is stylish, too. In short, perfectly fit for risk managers, heads of financial institutions and govt watchdogs. However, for those who read to improve their investment/trading, please give this book a pass.


5 out of 5 stars An Amazing Book   May 16, 2009
Bill Fletcher (Westlake Village, Ca)
1 out of 3 found this review helpful

This is a remarkable and riveting book. The writing is fluid and engaging. The ideas ... well, if you are addicted to ideas and connections you will not be able to put it down.

The general theme is complexity (of the financial markets, but also operating a nuclear power plant etc.), tight coupling (pool shots are tightly coupled) and the inevitable consequences of system that have both characteristics. The people and the internal politics are all there (struggles for power at Citicorp). What is statistical arbitrage vs. risk arbitrage is all there. It is absolutely fascinating.

I have finished it ... I am richly rewarded and that much wiser. Now I can have my life back.


Showing reviews 1-5 of 64
1 2 3 4 5 6 ...13Next »





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